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We consider a Cournot oligopoly model where multiple suppliers (oligopolists) compete by choosing quanti-
ties. We compare the social welfare achieved at a Cournot equilibrium to the maximum possible, for the case
where the inverse market demand function is convex. We establish a lower bound on the efficiency of Cournot
equilibria in terms of a scalar parameter derived from the inverse demand function, namely, the ratio of the
slope of the inverse demand function at the Cournot equilibrium to the average slope of the inverse demand
function between the Cournot equilibrium and a social optimum. Also, for the case of a single, monopolistic,
profit maximizing supplier, or of multiple suppliers who collude to maximize their total profit, we establish
a similar but tighter lower bound on the efficiency of the resulting output. Our results provide nontrivial
quantitative bounds on the loss of social welfare for several convex inverse demand functions that appear in
the economics literature.
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1. Introduction
We consider a Cournot oligopoly model where multiple suppliers (oligopolists) compete by choos-
ing quantities, with a focus on the case where the inverse market demand function is convex. Our
objectives are to compare the optimal social welfare to: (i) the social welfare at a Cournot equilib-
rium and (ii) the social welfare achieved when the suppliers collude to maximize the total profit,
or, equivalently, when there is a single supplier.
1.1. Background
In a book on oligopoly theory (see Chapter 2.4 of Friedman (1983)), Friedman raises two ques-
tions on the relation between Cournot equilibria and competitive equilibria. First, “is the Cournot
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equilibrium close, in some reasonable sense, to the competitive equilibrium?” Furthermore, “will
the two equilibria coincide as the number of firms goes to infinity?” The answer to the second
question seems to be positive, in general. Indeed, the efficiency properties of Cournot equilibria
in economies and markets with a large number of suppliers and/or consumers have been much
explored. For the case of a large number of suppliers, it is known that every Cournot equilibrium is
approximately a socially optimal competitive equilibrium (Gabszewicz and Vial 1972, Novshek and
Sonnenschein 1978, Novshek 1980). Furthermore, Ushio (1985) derives necessary and/or sufficient
conditions on the relative numbers of consumers and suppliers for the efficiency loss associated
with every Cournot equilibrium to approach zero, as the number of suppliers increases to infinity.
In more recent work, attention has turned to the efficiency of Cournot equilibria in settings that
involve an arbitrary (possibly small) number of suppliers or consumers. Anderson and Renault
(2003) quantify the efficiency loss in Cournot oligopoly models with concave demand functions.
However, most of their results focus on the relation between consumer surplus, producer surplus,
and the aggregate social welfare achieved at a Cournot equilibrium, rather than on the relation
between the social welfare achieved at a Cournot equilibrium and the optimal social welfare.
The concept of efficiency loss is intimately related to the concept of “price of anarchy,” advanced
by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou in a seminal paper (Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou 1999); it
provides a natural measure of the difference between a Cournot equilibrium and a socially optimal
competitive equilibrium. In the spirit of Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou (1999), we define the
efficiency of a Cournot equilibrium as the ratio of its aggregate social welfare to the optimal social
welfare. Recent works have reported various efficiency bounds for Cournot oligopoly with affine
demand functions. Kluberg and Perakis (2008) compare the social welfare and the aggregate profit
earned by the suppliers under Cournot competition to the corresponding maximum possible, for
the case where suppliers produce multiple differentiated products and demand is an affine function
of the price. Closer to the present paper, Johari and Tsitsiklis (2005) establish a 2/3 lower bound
on the efficiency of a Cournot equilibrium, when the inverse demand function is affine. They also
show that the 2/3 lower bound applies to a monopoly model with general concave demand.
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The efficiency loss in a Cournot oligopoly with some specific forms of convex inverse demand
functions has received some recent attention. Corchon (2008) studies the special case of convex
inverse demand functions of the form p(q) = α − βqγ , analyzes the efficiency loss at a Cournot
equilibrium and shows that when γ > 0, the worst case efficiency loss occurs when an efficient
supplier has to share the market with infinitely many inefficient suppliers. Guo and Yang (2005)
consider a class of inverse demand functions that solve a certain differential equation (for example,
constant elasticity inverse demand functions belong to this class), and establish efficiency lower
bounds that depend on equilibrium market shares, the market demand, and the number of suppliers.
In this paper, we study the efficiency loss in a Cournot oligopoly model with general convex
demand functions1. Convex demand functions, such as the negative exponential and the constant
elasticity demand curves, have been widely used in oligopoly analysis and marketing research
(Bulow and Pfleiderer 1983, Fabingeryand and Weyl 2009, Tyagi 1999). In general, a Cournot
equilibrium need not exist when the inverse demand function is convex. However, it is well known
that a Cournot equilibrium will exist if the inverse demand function is “not too convex” (e.g.,
if the inverse demand function is concave), in which case the quantities supplied by different
suppliers are strategic substitutes (Bulow et al. 1985, Berry and Pakes 2003). Existence results for
Cournot oligopolies for the case of strategic substitutes can be found in Novshek (1985), Gaudet and
Salant (1991), Svizzero (1991), and Long and Soubeyran (2000). Note however, that the strategic
substitutes condition is not necessary for the existence of Cournot equilibria. For example, using
the theory of ordinally supermodular games, Amir (1996) shows that the log-concavity of inverse
demand functions guarantees the existence of a Cournot equilibrium. In this paper, we will not
address the case of concave inverse demand functions, which appears to be qualitatively different,
as will be illustrated by an example in Section 3.5.
1 Since a demand function is generally nonincreasing, the convexity of a demand function implies that the correspond-
ing inverse demand function is also convex.
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1.2. Our contribution
For Cournot oligopolies with convex and nonincreasing demand functions, we establish a lower
bound of the form f(c/d) on the efficiency achieved at a Cournot equilibrium. Here, f is a function
given in closed form; c is the absolute value of the slope of the inverse demand function at the
Cournot equilibrium; and d is the absolute value of the slope of the line that agrees with the
inverse demand function at the Cournot equilibrium and at a socially optimal point. For convex
and nonincreasing inverse demand functions, we have c≥ d; for affine inverse demand functions,
we have c/d= 1. In the latter case, our efficiency bound is f(1) = 2/3, which is consistent with the
bound derived in Johari and Tsitsiklis (2005). More generally, the ratio c/d can be viewed as a
measure of nonlinearity of the inverse demand function. As the ratio c/d goes to infinity, the lower
bound converges to zero and arbitrarily high efficiency losses are possible. The usefulness of this
result lies in that it allows us to lower bound the efficiency of Cournot equilibria for a large class
of Cournot oligopoly models in terms of qualitative properties of the inverse demand function,
without having to restrict to the special case of affine demand functions, and without having to
calculate the equilibrium and the social optimum.
An interesting special case of our model arises when N = 1, in which case we are dealing with a
single, monopolistic, supplier. The previous lower bounds for Cournot equilibria continue to hold.
However, by using the additional assumption that N = 1, we can hope to obtain sharper (i.e.,
larger) lower bounds in terms of the same scalar parameter c/d. Let us also note that the case
N = 1 also covers a setting where there are multiple suppliers who choose to collude and coordinate
production so as to maximize their total profit.
1.3. Outline of the paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we formulate the model and review
available results on the existence of Cournot equilibria. In Section 3, we provide some mathematical
preliminaries on Cournot equilibria that will be useful later, including the fact that efficiency lower
bounds can be obtained by restricting to linear cost functions. In Section 4, we consider affine
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inverse demand functions and derive a refined lower bound on the efficiency of Cournot equilibria
that depends on a small amount of ex post information. We also show this bound to be tight.
In Section 5, we consider a more general model, involving convex inverse demand functions. We
show that for convex inverse demand functions, and for the purpose of studying the worst case
efficiency loss, it suffices to restrict to a special class of piecewise linear inverse demand functions.
This leads to the main result of this paper, a lower bound on the efficiency of Cournot equilibria
(Theorem 2). Based on this theorem, in Section 6 we derive a number of corollaries that provide
efficiency lower bounds that can be calculated without detailed information on these equilibria,
and apply these results to various commonly encountered convex inverse demand functions. In
Section 7, we establish a lower bound on the efficiency of monopoly outputs (Theorem 3), and
show by example that the social welfare at a monopoly output can be higher than that achieved at
a Cournot equilibrium (Example 8). Finally, in Section 8, we make some brief concluding remarks.
2. Formulation and Background
In this section, we define the Cournot competition model that we study in this paper. We also
review available results on the existence of Cournot equilibria.
We consider a market for a single homogeneous good with inverse demand function p : [0,∞)→
[0,∞) and N suppliers. Supplier n ∈ {1,2, . . . ,N} has a cost function Cn : [0,∞)→ [0,∞). Each
supplier n chooses a nonnegative real number xn, which is the amount of the good to be supplied by
her. The strategy profile x = (x1, x2, . . . , xN) results in a total supply denoted by X =
∑N
n=1 xn,
and a corresponding market price p(X). The payoff to supplier n is
pin(xn,x−n) = xnp(X)−Cn(xn),
where we have used the standard notation x−n to indicate the vector x with the component xn
omitted. A strategy profile x = (x1, x2, . . . , xN) is a Cournot (or Nash) equilibrium if
pin(xn,x−n)≥ pin(x,x−n), ∀ x≥ 0, ∀ n∈ {1,2, . . . ,N}.
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In the sequel, we denote by f ′ and f ′′ the first and second, respectively, derivatives of a scalar
function f , if they exist. For a function defined on a domain [0,Q], the derivatives at the endpoints
0 and Q are defined as left and right derivatives, respectively. For points in the interior of the
domain, and if the derivative is not guaranteed to exist, we use the notation ∂+f and ∂−f to denote
the right and left, respectively, derivatives of f ; these are guaranteed to exist for convex or concave
functions f .
2.1. Existence results
Some results on the existence of Cournot equilibrium are provided by Szidarovszky and Yakowitz
(1977), but require the concavity of the inverse demand function. Mcmanus (1964) provides an
existence result under minimal assumptions on the inverse demand function p(·), but only for the
special case where all suppliers have the same cost function C(·) — a rather restrictive assumption.
The most relevant result for our purposes is provided by Novshek (1985) who does not require the
suppliers to be identical or the inverse demand functions to be concave.
Proposition 1. (Novshek 1985) Suppose that the following conditions hold:
(a) The inverse demand function p(·) is continuous.
(b) There exists a real number Q > 0 such that p(q) = 0 for q ≥Q. Furthermore, p(·) is twice
continuously differentiable and strictly decreasing on [0,Q).
(c) For every q ∈ [0,Q), we have p′(q) + qp′′(q)≤ 0.
(d) The cost functions Cn(·), n= 1,2, . . . ,N , are nondecreasing and lower-semi-continuous.
Then, there exists a Cournot equilibrium.
If the inverse demand function p(·) is convex, the condition (c) in the preceding proposition
implies that
∂2pin
∂xn∂xm
(X)≤ 0, ∀ m 6= n, ∀ X ∈ (0,Q),
i.e., that the quantities supplied by different suppliers are strategic substitutes. We finally note that
Amir (1996) proves existence of a Cournot equilibrium in a setting where the strategic substitutes
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condition does not hold. Instead, this reference assumes that the inverse demand function p(·) is
strictly decreasing and log-concave.
3. Preliminaries on Cournot Equilibria
In this section, we introduce several main assumptions that we will be working with, and some
definitions. In Section 3.1, we present conditions for a nonnegative vector to be a social optimum
or a Cournot equilibrium. Then, in Section 3.2, we define the efficiency of a Cournot equilibrium.
In Sections 3.3 and 3.4, we derive some properties of Cournot equilibria that will be useful later,
but which may also be of some independent interest. For example, we show that the worst case
efficiency occurs when the cost functions are linear. The proofs of all propositions in this section
(except for Proposition 4) are given in Appendix A.
Assumption 1. For any n, the cost function Cn : [0,∞)→ [0,∞) is convex, continuous, and non-
decreasing on [0,∞), and continuously differentiable on (0,∞). Furthermore, Cn(0) = 0.
Assumption 2. The inverse demand function p : [0,∞)→ [0,∞) is continuous, nonnegative, and
nonincreasing, with p(0)> 0. Its right derivative at 0 exists and at every q > 0, its left and right
derivatives also exist.
Note that we do not yet assume that the inverse demand function is convex. The reason is that
some of the results to be derived in this section are valid even in the absence of such a convexity
assumption. Note also that some parts of our assumptions are redundant, but are included for easy
reference. For example, if Cn(·) is convex and nonnegative, with Cn(0) = 0, then it is automatically
continuous and nondecreasing.
Definition 1. The optimal social welfare is the optimal objective value in the following opti-
mization problem,
maximize
∫ X
0
p(q)dq−
N∑
n=1
Cn(xn)
subject to xn ≥ 0, n= 1,2, . . . ,N,
(1)
where X =
∑N
n=1 xn.
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In the above definition,
∫ X
0
p(q)dq is the aggregate consumer surplus and
∑N
n=1Cn(xn) is the
total cost of the suppliers. The objective function in (1) is a measure of the social welfare across
the entire economy of consumers and suppliers, the same measure as the one used in Ushio (1985)
and Anderson and Renault (2003).
For a model with a nonincreasing continuous inverse demand function and continuous convex
cost functions, the following assumption guarantees the existence of an optimal solution to (1),
because it essentially restricts the optimization to the compact set of vectors x for which xn ≤R,
for all n.
Assumption 3. There exists some R> 0 such that p(R)≤minn{C ′n(0)}.
3.1. Optimality and equilibrium conditions
We observe that under Assumption 1 and 2, the objective function in (1) is concave. Hence, we
have the following necessary and sufficient conditions for a vector xS to achieve the optimal social
welfare: {
C ′n(x
S
n) = p
(
XS
)
, if xSn > 0,
C ′n(0)≥ p
(
XS
)
, if xSn = 0,
(2)
where XS =
∑N
n=1 x
S
n.
The social optimization problem (1) may admit multiple optimal solutions. However, as we now
show, they must all result in the same price. We note that the differentiability of the cost functions
is crucial for this result to hold.
Proposition 2. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. All optimal solutions to (1) result in the
same price.
There are similar equilibrium conditions for a strategy profile x. In particular, under Assumptions
1 and 2, if x is a Cournot equilibrium, then
C ′n(xn)≤ p (X) +xn · ∂−p (X) , if xn > 0, (3)
C ′n(xn)≥ p (X) +xn · ∂+p (X) , (4)
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where again X =
∑N
n=1 xn. Note, however, that in the absence of further assumptions, the payoff of
supplier n need not be a concave function of xn and these conditions are, in general, not sufficient.
We will say that a nonnegative vector x is a Cournot candidate if it satisfies the necessary
conditions (3)-(4). Note that for a given model, the set of Cournot equilibria is a subset of the set
of Cournot candidates. Most of the results obtained in this section, including the efficiency lower
bound in Proposition 6, apply to all Cournot candidates.
For convex inverse demand functions, the necessary conditions (3)-(4) can be further refined.
Proposition 3. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, and that the inverse demand function
p(·) is convex. If x is a Cournot candidate with X =∑Nn=1 xn > 0, then p(·) must be differentiable
at X, i.e.,
∂−p (X) = ∂+p (X) .
Because of the above proposition, when Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and the inverse demand
function is convex, we have the following necessary (and, by definition, sufficient) conditions for a
nonzero vector x to be a Cournot candidate:
{
C ′n(xn) = p (X) +xnp
′(X), if xn > 0,
C ′n(0)≥ p (X) +xnp′(X), if xn = 0.
(5)
3.2. Efficiency of Cournot equilibria
As shown in Friedman (1977), if p(0) > minn{C ′n(0)}, then the aggregate supply at a Cournot
equilibrium is positive; see Proposition 4 below for a slight generalization. If on the other hand
p(0) ≤ minn{C ′n(0)}, then the model is uninteresting, because no supplier has an incentive to
produce and the optimal social welfare is zero. This motivates the assumption that follows.
Assumption 4. The price at zero supply is larger than the minimum marginal cost of the suppliers,
i.e.,
p(0)>min
n
{C ′n(0)}.
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Proposition 4. Suppose that Assumptions 1, 2, and 4 hold. If x is a Cournot candidate, then
X > 0.
Proof Suppose that p(0)>minn{C ′n(0)}. Then, the vector x = (0, . . . ,0) violates condition (4),
and cannot be a Cournot candidate. 
Under Assumption 4, at least one supplier has an incentive to choose a positive quantity, which
leads us to the next result.
Proposition 5. Suppose that Assumptions 1-4 hold. Then, the social welfare achieved at a
Cournot candidate, as well as the optimal social welfare [cf. (1)], are positive.
We now define the efficiency of a Cournot equilibrium as the ratio of the social welfare that it
achieves to the optimal social welfare. It is actually convenient to define the efficiency of a general
vector x, not necessarily a Cournot equilibrium.
Definition 2. Suppose that Assumptions 1-4 hold. The efficiency of a nonnegative vector x =
(x1, . . . , xN) is defined as
γ(x) =
∫ X
0
p(q)dq−
N∑
n=1
Cn(xn)∫ XS
0
p(q)dq−
N∑
n=1
Cn(x
S
n)
, (6)
where xS =(xS1 , . . . , x
S
N) is an optimal solution of the optimization problem in (1) and X
S =∑N
n=1 x
S
n.
We note that γ(x) is well defined: because of Assumption 4 and Proposition 5, the denominator
on the right-hand side of (6) is guaranteed to be positive. Furthermore, even if there are multiple
socially optimal solutions xS, the value of the denominator is the same for all such xS. Note that
γ(x)≤ 1 for every nonnegative vector x. Furthermore, if x is a Cournot candidate, then γ(x)> 0,
by Proposition 5.
3.3. Restricting to linear cost functions
In this section, we show that in order to study the worst-case efficiency of Cournot equilibria, it
suffices to consider linear cost functions. We first provide a lower bound on γ(x) and then proceed
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to interpret it.
Proposition 6. Suppose that Assumptions 1-4 hold and that p(·) is convex. Let x be a Cournot
candidate which is not socially optimal, and let αn =C
′
n(xn). Consider a modified model in which
we replace the cost function of each supplier n by a new function Cn(·), defined by
Cn(x) = αnx, ∀ x≥ 0.
Then, for the modified model, Assumptions 1-4 still hold, the vector x is a Cournot candidate, and
its efficiency, denoted by γ(x), satisfies 0<γ(x)≤ γ(x).
If x is a Cournot equilibrium, then it satisfies Eqs. (3)-(4), and therefore is a Cournot candidate.
Hence, Proposition 6 applies to all Cournot equilibria that are not socially optimal. We note that
if a Cournot candidate x is socially optimal for the original model, then the optimal social welfare
in the modified model could be zero, in which case γ(x) = 1, but γ(x) is undefined; see the example
that follows.
Example 1. Consider a model involving two suppliers (N = 2). The cost function of supplier n is
Cn(x) = x
2, for n= 1,2. The inverse demand function is constant, with p(q) = 1 for any q ≥ 0. It
is not hard to see that the vector (1/2,1/2) is a Cournot candidate, which is also socially optimal.
In the modified model, we have Cn(x) = x, for n= 1,2. The optimal social welfare achieved in the
modified model is zero. 
Note that even if x is a Cournot equilibrium in the original model, it need not be a Cournot
equilibrium in the modified model with linear cost functions, as illustrated by our next example.
On the other hand, Proposition 6 asserts that a Cournot candidate in the original model remains
a Cournot candidate in the modified model. Hence, to lower bound the efficiency of a Cournot
equilibrium in the original model, it suffices to lower bound the efficiency achieved at a worst
Cournot candidate for a modified model. Accordingly, and for the purpose of deriving lower bounds,
we can (and will) restrict to the case of linear cost functions, and study the worst case efficiency
over all Cournot candidates.
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Example 2. Consider a model involving only one supplier (N = 1). The cost function of the
supplier is C1(x) = x
2. The inverse demand function is given by
p(q) =
{−q+ 4, if 0≤ q≤ 4/3,
max{0,−1
5
(q− 4/3) + 8/3}, if 4/3< q,
which is convex and satisfies Assumption 2. It can be verified that x1 = 1 maximizes the supplier’s
profit and thus is a Cournot equilibrium in the original model. In the modified model, C1(·) is
linear with a slope of 2; the supplier can maximize its profit at x1 = 7/3. Therefore, in the modified
model, x1 = 1 remains a Cournot candidate, but not a Cournot equilibrium. 
3.4. Other properties of Cournot candidates
In this subsection, we collect a few useful and intuitive properties of Cournot candidates. We show
that at a Cournot candidate there are two possibilities: either p(X)> p(XS) andX <XS, or p(X) =
p(XS) (Proposition 7); in the latter case, under the additional assumption that p(·) is convex, a
Cournot candidate is socially optimal (Proposition 8). In either case, imperfect competition can
never result in a price that is less than the socially optimal price.
Proposition 7. Suppose that Assumptions 1-4 hold. Let x and xS be a Cournot candidate and
an optimal solution to (1), respectively. If p(X) 6= p(XS), then p(X)> p(XS) and X <XS.
For the case where p(X) = p(XS), Proposition 7 does not provide any comparison between X
and XS. While one usually has X <XS (imperfect competition results in lower quantities), it is
also possible that X >XS, as in the following example.
Example 3. Consider a model involving two suppliers (N = 2). The cost function of each supplier
is linear, with slope equal to 1. The inverse demand function is convex, of the form
p(q) =
{
2− q, if 0≤ q≤ 1,
1, if 1< q.
It is not hard to see that any nonnegative vector xS that satisfies xS1 + x
S
2 ≥ 1 is socially optimal;
xS1 = x
S
2 = 1/2 is one such vector. On the other hand, it can be verified that x1 = x2 = 1 is a Cournot
equilibrium. Hence, in this example, 2 =X >XS = 1. 
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Proposition 8. Suppose that Assumptions 1-4 hold and that the inverse demand function is con-
vex. Let x and xS be a Cournot candidate and an optimal solution to (1), respectively. If p(X) =
p(XS), then p′(X) = 0 and γ(x) = 1.
Proposition 2 shows that all social optima lead to a unique “socially optimal” price. Combining
with Proposition 8, we conclude that if p(·) is convex, a Cournot candidate is socially optimal if
and only if it results in the socially optimal price.
3.5. Concave inverse demand functions
In this section, we argue that the case of concave inverse demand functions is fundamentally
different. For this reason, the study of the concave case would require a very different line of
analysis, and is not considered further in this paper.
According to Proposition 8, if the inverse demand function is convex and if the price at a Cournot
equilibrium equals the price at a socially optimal point, then the Cournot equilibrium is socially
optimal. For nonconvex inverse demand functions, this is not necessarily true: a socially optimal
price can be associated with a socially suboptimal Cournot equilibrium, as demonstrated by the
following example.
Example 4. Consider a model involving two suppliers (N = 2), with C1(x) = x and C2(x) = x
2.
The inverse demand function is concave on the interval where it is positive, of the form
p(q) =
{
1, if 0≤ q≤ 1,
max{0,−M(q− 1) + 1}, if 1< q,
where M > 2. It is not hard to see that the vector (0.5,0.5) satisfies the optimality conditions in
(2), and is therefore socially optimal. We now argue that (1/M,1−1/M) is a Cournot equilibrium.
Given the action x2 = 1/M of supplier 2, any action on the interval [0,1− 1/M ] is a best response
for supplier 1. Given the action x1 = 1− (1/M) of supplier 1, a simple calculation shows that
arg max
x∈[0,∞)
{
x · p(x+ 1− 1/M)−x2}= 1/M.
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Hence, (1/M,1− 1/M) is a Cournot equilibrium. Note that X = XS = 1. However, the optimal
social welfare is 0.25, while the social welfare achieved at the Cournot equilibrium is 1/M −1/M 2.
By considering arbitrarily large M , the corresponding efficiency can be made arbitrarily small. 
The preceding example shows that arbitrarily high efficiency losses are possible, even if X =
XS. The possibility of inefficient allocations even when the price is the correct one opens up the
possibility of substantial inefficiencies that are hard to bound.
4. Affine Inverse Demand Functions
We now turn our attention to the special case of affine inverse demand functions. It is already
known from Johari and Tsitsiklis (2005) that 2/3 is a tight lower bound on the efficiency of Cournot
equilibria. In this section, we refine this result by providing a tighter lower bound, based on a small
amount of ex post information about a Cournot equilibrium.
Throughout this section, we assume an inverse demand function of the form
p(q) =
{
b− aq, if 0≤ q≤ b/a,
0, if b/a < q,
(7)
where a and b are positive constants.2 Under the assumption of convex costs (Assumption 1), a
Cournot equilibrium is guaranteed to exist, by Proposition 1.
The main result of this section follows.
Theorem 1. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds (convex cost functions), and that the inverse
demand function is affine, of the form (7).3 Suppose also that b >minn{C ′n(0)} (Assumption 4).
Let x be a Cournot equilibrium, and let αn =C
′
n(xn). Let also
β =
aX
b−minn{αn} ,
If X > b/a, then x is socially optimal. Otherwise:
2 Note that the model considered here is slightly different from that in Johari and Tsitsiklis (2005). In that work,
the inverse demand function is literally affine and approaches minus infinity as the total supply increases to infinity.
However, as remarked in that paper (p. 20), this difference does not affect the results.
3 Note that Assumptions 2 and 3 hold automatically.
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(a) We have 1/2≤ β < 1.
(b) The efficiency of x satisfies,
γ(x)≥ g(β) = 3β2− 4β+ 2.
(c) The bound in part (b) is tight. That is, for every β ∈ [1/2,1) and every  > 0, there exists a
model with a Cournot equilibrium whose efficiency is no more than g(β)+.
(d) The function g(β) is minimized at β = 2/3 and the worst case efficiency is 2/3.
Theorem 1 is proved in Appendix B.1. The lower bound g(β) is illustrated in Fig. 1. Consider a
Cournot equilibrium such that X ≤ b/a. For the special case where all the cost functions are linear,
of the form Cn(xn) = αn, Theorem 1 has an interesting interpretation. We first note that a socially
optimal solution is obtained when the price b− aq equals the marginal cost of a “best” supplier,
namely minnαn. In particular, X
S = (b −minn{αn})/a, and β = X/XS. Since p′(X) = −a < 0,
Proposition 8 implies that p(X) 6= p(XS), and Proposition 7 implies that β < 1. Theorem 1 further
states that β ≥ 1/2. i.e., that the total supply at a Cournot equilibrium is at least half of the socially
optimal supply. Clearly, if β is close to 1 we expect the efficiency loss due to the difference XS−X
to be small. However, efficiency losses may also arise if the total supply at a Cournot equilibrium
is not provided by the most efficient suppliers. (As shown in Example 4, in the nonconvex case this
effect can be substantial.) Our result shows that, for the convex case, β can be used to lower bound
the total efficiency loss due to this second factor as well; when β is close to 1, the efficiency indeed
remains close to 1. (This is in sharp contrast to the nonconvex case where we can have X =XS but
large efficiency losses.) Somewhat surprisingly, the worst case efficiency also tends to be somewhat
better for low β, that is, when β approaches 1/2, as compared to intermediate values (β ≈ 2/3).
5. Convex Inverse Demand Functions
In this section we study the efficiency of Cournot equilibria under more general assumptions.
Instead of restricting the inverse demand function to be affine, we will only assume that it is
convex. A Cournot equilibrium need not exist in general, but it does exist under some conditions
(cf. Section 2.1). Our results apply whenever a Cournot equilibrium happens to exist.
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Figure 1 A tight lower bound on the efficiency of Cournot equilibria for the case of affine inverse demand functions.
We first show that a lower bound on the efficiency of a Cournot equilibrium can be established by
calculating its efficiency in another model with a piecewise linear inverse demand function. Then,
in Theorem 2, we establish a lower bound on the efficiency of Cournot equilibria, as a function of
the ratio of the slope of the inverse demand function at the Cournot equilibrium to the average
slope of the inverse demand function between the Cournot equilibrium and a socially optimal point.
Then, in Section 6, we will apply Theorem 2 to specific convex inverse demand functions. Recall
our definition of a Cournot candidate as a vector x that satisfies the necessary conditions (3)-(4).
Proposition 9. Suppose that Assumptions 1-4 hold, and that the inverse demand function is
convex. Let x and xS be a Cournot candidate and an optimal solution to (1), respectively. Assume
that p(X) 6= p(XS) and let4 c= |p′(X)|. Consider a modified model in which we replace the inverse
demand function by a new function p0(·), defined by
p0(q) =

−c(q−X) + p(X), if 0≤ q≤X,
max
{
0,
p(XS)− p(X)
XS −X (q−X) + p(X)
}
, if X < q.
(8)
4 According to Proposition 3, p′(X) must exist.
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Figure 2 The efficiency of a Cournot equilibrium cannot increase if we replace the inverse demand function by
the piecewise linear function p0(·). The function p0(·) is tangent to the inverse demand function p(·) at
the equilibrium point, and connects the Cournot equilibrium point with the socially optimal point.
Then, for the modified model, with inverse demand function p0(·), the vector xS remains socially
optimal, and the efficiency of x, denoted by γ0(x), satisfies
γ0(x)≤ γ(x).
Proof Since p(X) 6= p(XS), Proposition 7 implies that X <XS, so that p0(·) is well defined.
Since the necessary and sufficient optimality conditions in (2) only involve the value of the inverse
demand function at XS, which has been unchanged, the vector xS remains socially optimal for the
modified model.
Let
A=
∫ X
0
p0(q)dq, B =
∫ XS
X
p(q)dq, C =
∫ XS
X
(p0(q)− p(q))dq, D=
∫ X
0
(p(q)− p0(q))dq.
See Fig. 2 for an illustration of p(·) and a graphical interpretation of A, B, C, D. Note that since
p(·) is convex, we have C ≥ 0 and D ≥ 0. The efficiency of x in the original model with inverse
demand function p(·), is
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0<γ(x) =
A+D−∑Nn=1Cn(xn)
A+B+D−∑Nn=1Cn(xSn) ≤ 1,
where the first inequality is true because the social welfare achieved at any Cournot candidate is
positive (Proposition 5). The efficiency of x in the modified model is
γ0(x) =
A−∑Nn=1Cn(xn)
A+B+C −∑Nn=1Cn(xSn) .
Note that the denominators in the above formulas for γ(x) and γ0(x) are all positive, by Proposi-
tion 5.
If A−∑Nn=1Cn(xn)≤ 0, then γ0(x)≤ 0 and the result is clearly true. We can therefore assume
that A−∑Nn=1Cn(xn)> 0. We then have
0 < γ0(x) =
A−
N∑
n=1
Cn(xn)
A+B+C −
N∑
n=1
Cn(xSn)
≤
A+D−
N∑
n=1
Cn(xn)
A+B+C +D−
N∑
n=1
Cn(xSn)
≤
A+D−
N∑
n=1
Cn(xn)
A+B+D−
N∑
n=1
Cn(xSn)
= γ(x)≤ 1,
which proves the desired result. 
Note that unless p(·) happens to be linear on the interval [X,XS], the function p0(·) is not
differentiable at X and, according to Proposition 3, x cannot be a Cournot candidate for the
modified model. Nevertheless, p0(·) can still be used to derive a lower bound on the efficiency of
Cournot candidates in the original model, as will be seen in the proof of Theorem 2, which is our
main result.
Theorem 2. Suppose that Assumptions 1-4 hold, and that the inverse demand function is convex.
Let x and xS be a Cournot candidate and a solution to (1), respectively. Then, the following hold.
(a) If p(X) = p(XS), then γ(x) = 1.
(b) If p(X) 6= p(XS), let c = |p′(X)|, d = |(p(XS) − p(X))/(XS −X)|, and c = c/d. We have
c≥ 1 and
1>γ(x)≥ f(c) = φ
2 + 2
φ2 + 2φ+ c
, (9)
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Figure 3 Plot of the lower bound on the efficiency of a Cournot equilibrium in a Cournot oligopoly with convex
inverse demand functions, as a function of the ratio c/d (cf. Theorem 2).
where
φ= max
{
2− c+
√
c2− 4c+ 12
2
,1
}
.
Remark 1. We do not know whether the lower bound in Theorem 2 is tight. The difficulty in
proving tightness is due to the fact that the vector x need not be a Cournot equilibrium in the
modified model.
We provide the proof of Theorem 2 in Appendix B.2. Fig. 3 shows a plot of the lower bound f(c)
on the efficiency of Cournot equilibria, as a function of c= c/d. If p(·) is affine, then c= c/d= 1.
From (9), it can be verified that f(1) = 2/3, which agrees with the lower bound in Johari and
Tsitsiklis (2005) for the affine case. We note that the lower bound f(c) is monotonically decreasing
in c, over the domain [1,∞). When c ∈ [1,3), φ is at least 1, and monotonically decreasing in c.
When c≥ 3, φ= 1.
6. Applications
For a given inverse demand function p(·), the lower bound derived in Theorem 2 requires some
knowledge on the Cournot candidate and the social optimum, namely, the aggregate supplies X
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and XS. Even so, for a large class of inverse demand functions, we can apply Theorem 2 to
establish lower bounds on the efficiency of Cournot equilibria that do not require knowledge of X
and XS. With additional information on the suppliers’ cost functions, the lower bounds can be
further refined. At the end of this section, we apply our results to calculate nontrivial quantitative
efficiency bounds for various convex inverse demand functions that have been considered in the
economics literature.
Corollary 1. Suppose that Assumptions 1-4 hold and that the inverse demand function is convex.
Suppose also that p(Q) = 0 for some Q> 0, and that the ratio, µ= ∂+p(0)/∂−p(Q), is finite. Then,
the efficiency of a Cournot candidate is at least f(µ).
The proof of Corollary 1 can be found in Appendix B.3. For convex inverse demand functions,
e.g., for negative exponential demand, with
p(q) = max{0, α−β log q}, 0<α, 0<β, 0≤ q,
Corollary 1 does not apply, because the left derivative of p(·) at 0 is infinite. This motivates us to
refine the lower bound in Corollary 1. By using a small amount of additional information on the
cost functions, we can derive an upper bound on the total supply at a social optimum, as well as
a lower bound on the total supply at a Cournot equilibrium, to strengthen Corollary 1.
Corollary 2. Suppose that Assumptions 1-4 hold and that p(·) is convex. Let5
s= inf{q | p(q) = min
n
C ′n(0)}, t= inf
{
q
∣∣ min
n
C ′n(q)≥ p(q) + q∂+p(q)
}
. (10)
If ∂−p(s)< 0, then the efficiency of a Cournot candidate is at least f (∂+p(t)/∂−p(s)).
Remark 2. If there exists a “best” supplier n such that C ′n(x)≤C ′m(x), for any other supplier m
and any x> 0, then the parameters s and t depend only on p(·) and C ′n(·).
Corollary 2 is proved in Appendix B.4. We now apply Corollary 2 to three examples.
5 Under Assumption 3, the existence of the real numbers defined in (10) is guaranteed.
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Example 5. Suppose that Assumptions 1, 3, and 4 hold, and that there is a best supplier, whose
cost function is linear with a slope c≥ 0. Consider inverse demand functions of the form (cf. Eq.
(6) in Bulow and Pfleiderer (1983))
p(q) = max{0, α−β log q}, 0< q, (11)
where α and β are positive constants. Note that Corollary 1 does not apply, because the left
derivative of p(·) at 0 is infinite.6 Since
p′(q) + qp′′(q) =
−β
q
+
qβ
q2
= 0, ∀q ∈ (0, exp(α/β)),
Proposition 1 implies that there exists a Cournot equilibrium. Through a simple calculation we
obtain
s= exp
(
α− c
β
)
, t= exp
(
α−β− c
β
)
.
From Corollary 2 we obtain that for every Cournot equilibrium x,
γ(x)≥ f
(
exp ((α− c)/β)
exp ((α−β− c)/β)
)
= f (exp (1))≥ 0.5237. (12)
Now we argue that the efficiency lower bound (12) holds even without the assumption that there
is a best supplier associated with a linear cost function. From Proposition 6, the efficiency of any
Cournot equilibrium x will not increase if the cost function of each supplier n is replaced by
Cn(x) =C
′
n(xn)x, ∀x≥ 0.
Let c= minn{C ′n(xn)}. Since the efficiency lower bound in (12) holds for the modified model with
linear cost functions, it applies whenever the inverse demand function is of the form (11). 
6 In fact, p(0) is undefined. This turns out to not be an issue: for a small enough  > 0, we can guarantee that no
supplier chooses a quantity below . Furthermore, lim↓0
∫ 
0
p(q)dq = 0. For this reason, the details of the inverse
demand function in the vicinity of zero are immaterial as far as the chosen quantities or the resulting social welfare
are concerned.
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Example 6. Suppose that Assumptions 1, 3, and 4 hold, and that there is a best supplier, whose
cost function is linear with a slope c≥ 0. Consider inverse demand functions of the form (cf. Eq.
(5) in Bulow and Pfleiderer (1983))
p(q) = max{α−βqδ,0}, 0< δ≤ 1, (13)
where α and β are positive constants. Note that if δ = 1, then p(·) is affine; if 0< δ ≤ 1, then p(·)
is convex. Assumption 4 implies that α>χ. Since
p′(q) + qp′′(q) =−βδqδ−1−βδ(δ− 1)qδ−1 =−βδ2qδ−1 ≤ 0, 0≤ q≤
(
α
β
)1/δ
,
Proposition 1 implies that there exists a Cournot equilibrium. Through a simple calculation we
have
s=
(
α− c
β
)1/δ
, t=
(
α− c
β(δ+ 1)
)1/δ
.
From Corollary 2 we know that for every Cournot equilibrium x,
γ(x)≥ f
(−βδtδ−1
−βδsδ−1
)
= f
(
(δ+ 1)
1−δ
δ
)
.
Using the argument in Example 5, we conclude that this lower bound also applies to the case of
general convex cost functions. 
As we will see in the following example, it is sometimes hard to find a closed form expression
for the real number t. In such cases, since s is an upper bound for the aggregate supply at a social
optimum (cf. the proof of Corollary 2 in Appendix B.4), Corollary 2 implies that the efficiency of
a Cournot candidate is at least f (∂+p(0)/∂−p(s)). Furthermore, in terms of the aggregate supply
at a Cournot equilibrium X, we know that γ(x)≥ f (p′(X)/∂−p(s)).
Example 7. Suppose that Assumptions 1, 3, and 4 hold, and that there is a best supplier, whose
cost function is linear with a slope c≥ 0. Consider inverse demand functions of the form (cf. p. 8
in Fabingeryand and Weyl (2009))
p(q) =
{
α (Q− q)β, 0< q≤Q,
0, Q< q,
(14)
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where Q> 0, α> 0 and β ≥ 1. Assumption 4 implies that c < αQβ. Note that Corollary 1 does not
apply, because the right derivative of p(·) at Q is zero. Through a simple calculation we obtain
s=Q−
( c
α
)1/β
,
and
p′(s) = αβ
( c
α
)(β−1)/β
, ∂+p(0) = αβQ
β−1.
Corollary 2 implies that for every Cournot equilibrium x,
γ(x)≥ f
(
∂+p(0)
p′(s)
)
= f
((
αQβ
c
)(β−1)/β)
= f
((
p(0)
c
)(β−1)/β)
.
Using information on the aggregate demand at the equilibrium, the efficiency bound can be refined.
Since
p′(X) = αβ(Q−X)β−1,
we have
γ(x)≥ f
(
p′(X)
p′(s)
)
= f
((
α(Q−X)β
c
)(β−1)/β)
= f
((
p(X)
c
)(β−1)/β)
, (15)
so that the efficiency bound depends only on the ratio of the equilibrium price to the marginal cost
of the best supplier, and the parameter β. For affine inverse demand functions, we have β = 1 and
the bound in (15) equals f(1) = 2/3, which agrees with Theorem 1. 
7. Monopoly and Social Welfare
In this section we study the special case where N = 1, so that we are dealing with a single,
monopolistic, supplier. As we explain, this case also covers a setting where multiple suppliers
collude to maximize their total profit. By using the additional assumption that N = 1, we obtain a
sharper (i.e., larger) lower bound, in Theorem 3. We then establish lower bounds on the efficiency
of monopoly outputs that do not require knowledge of X and XS.
In a Cournot oligopoly, the maximum possible profit earned by all suppliers (if they collude) is
an optimal solution to the following optimization problem,
maximize p
(
N∑
n=1
xn
)
·
N∑
n=1
xn−
N∑
n=1
Cn(xn)
subject to xn ≥ 0, n= 1, . . . ,N.
(16)
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We use xP = (xP1 , . . . , x
P
N) to denote an optimal solution to (16) (a monopoly output), and let
XP =
N∑
n=1
xPn .
It is not hard to see that the aggregate supply at a monopoly output, XP , is also a Cournot
equilibrium in a modified model with a single supplier (N=1) and a cost function given by
C(X) = inf
N∑
n=1
Cn(xn),
subject to xn ≥ 0, n= 1, . . . ,N ;
N∑
n=1
xn =X.
(17)
Note that C(·) is convex (linear) when the Cn(·) are convex (respectively, linear). Furthermore, the
social welfare at the monopoly output xP , is the same as that achieved at the Cournot equilibrium,
x1 =X
P , in the modified model. Also, the socially optimal value of X, as well as the resulting social
welfare is the same for the N -supplier model and the above defined modified model with N = 1.
Therefore, the efficiency of the monopoly output equals the efficiency of the Cournot equilibrium
of the modified model. To lower bound the efficiency of monopoly outputs resulting from multiple
colluding suppliers, we can (and will) restrict to the case with N = 1.
Theorem 3. Suppose that Assumptions 1-4 hold, and the inverse demand function is convex. Let
xS and xP be a social optimum and a monopoly output, respectively. Then, the following hold.
(a) If p(XP ) = p(XS), then γ(xP ) = 1.
(b) If p(XP ) 6= p(XS), let c = |p′(XP )|, d = |(p(XS) − p(XP ))/(XS −XP )|, and c = c/d. We
have c≥ 1 and
γ(xP )≥ 3
3 + c
. (18)
(c) The bound is tight at c= 1, i.e., there exists a model with c= 1 and a monopoly output whose
efficiency is 3/4.
The proof for Theorem 3 can be found in Appendix C.1. Fig. 4 compares the efficiency lower
bounds established for Cournot equilibria with that for monopoly outputs. For c= 1, both efficiency
bounds are tight and it is possible for a monopoly output to achieve a higher efficiency than that
of a Cournot equilibrium, as shown in the following example.
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Figure 4 Comparison of the lower bounds on the efficiency of Cournot equilibria and monopoly outputs for the
case of convex inverse demand functions.
Example 8. Consider the model introduced in the proof of part (c) of Theorem 1. The inverse
demand function is p(q) = max{1− q,0}. The cost functions are linear:
CN1 (x1) = 0, C
N
n (xn) =
(
1/3− 1/3
N − 1
)
xn, n= 2, . . . ,N.
If all suppliers collude to maximize the total profit, the output will be
xP1 = 1/2, x
P
n = 0, n= 2, . . . ,N,
and γ(xP ) = 3/4. On the other hand, it can be verified that the vector
x1 = 1/3, xn =
1/3
N − 1 , n= 2, . . . ,N,
is a Cournot equilibrium. For any N ≥ 2, a simple calculation shows that the associated efficiency is
(6N −4)/(9N −9). For example, in a model with N = 10, the efficiency of the Cournot equilibrium
is less than that of the monopoly output, i.e., γ(xP ) = 3/4> 56/81 = γ(x). 
The above example agrees with the observation in earlier works that a monopoly output is not
necessarily less efficient than an equilibrium resulting from imperfect competition (Comanor and
Leibenstein 1969, Crew and Rowley 1977).
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We now derive a result similar to Corollary 2, and then apply it to a numerical example with
the same inverse demand function as in Example 5.
Corollary 3. Suppose that Assumptions 1-4 hold, and that p(·) is convex. Let s and t be the real
numbers defined in (10). If ∂−p(s)< 0, then for any monopoly output xP , we have
γ(xP )≥ ∂−p(s)
3∂−p(s) + ∂+p(t)
.
Corollary 3 is proved in Appendix C.2.
Example 9. Suppose that Assumptions 1, 3, and 4 hold, and that there is a best supplier, whose
cost function is linear with a slope χ≥ 0. Consider inverse demand functions of the form in (11).
Through a simple calculation we have
s= exp
(
α−χ
β
)
, t= exp
(
α−β−χ
β
)
,
and
p′(t)
p′(s)
=
exp((α−χ)/β)
exp ((α−β−χ)/β) = exp(1).
According to Corollary 3, for every monopoly output xP we have,
γ(xP )≥ 3/(3 + exp(1))= 0.525. (19)
Using the argument in Example 5, we conclude that this efficiency bound also applies to the
case of nonlinear (convex) cost functions. 
8. Conclusion
It is well known that Cournot oligopoly can yield arbitrarily high efficiency loss in general; for
details, see Johari (2004). For Cournot oligopoly with convex market demand and cost functions,
results such as those provided in Theorem 2 show that the efficiency loss of a Cournot equilibrium
can be bounded away from zero by a function of a scalar parameter that captures quantitative
properties of the inverse demand function. With additional information on the cost functions, the
efficiency lower bounds can be further refined. Our results apply to various convex inverse demand
functions that have been considered in the economics literature.
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Appendix A: Proofs of the results in Section 3
A.1. Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose not, in which case there exist two optimal solutions, xS and xS, such that p(XS) 6= p(XS).
Without loss of generality, we assume that p(XS) > p(X
S
). Since p(·) is nonincreasing, we must
have XS <X
S
. For all n such that xSn > 0, the optimality conditions (2) yield
C ′n(x
S
n) = p(X
S
)< p(XS)≤C ′n(xSn).
Using the convexity of the cost functions, we obtain
xSn <x
S
n, if x
S
n > 0,
This contradicts the assumption that XS <X
S
, and the desired result follows.
A.2. Proof of Proposition 3
Let x be a Cournot candidate with X > 0. The conditions (3)-(4) applied to some n with xn > 0,
imply that
p (X) +xn · ∂−p (X)≥ p (X) +xn · ∂+p (X) .
On the other hand, since p(·) is convex, we have ∂−p (X)≤ ∂+p (X). Hence, ∂−p (X) = ∂+p (X), as
claimed.
A.3. Proof of Proposition 5
Using Assumption 4, we can choose some k such that p(0)>C ′k(0). The right derivative with respect
to xk of the obejctive function in (1), evaluated at x = (0,0, . . . ,0), is p(0)−Ck(0)> 0. Hence the
optimal value of the objective is strictly larger than the zero value obtained when x = (0,0, . . . ,0).
Thus, the optimal social welfare is positive.
Now consider the social welfare achieved at a Cournot candidate x = (x1, . . . , xN). Because of
Assumption 4, Proposition 4 applies, and we have X > 0. For any supplier n such that xn > 0,
the necessary conditions (3) and the fact that p(·) is nonincreasing imply that C ′n(xn) ≤ p (X).
Suppose that C ′n(xn) = p (X) for every supplier n with xn > 0. Then, the necessary conditions
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(3)-(4) imply that x satisfies the sufficient optimality conditions in (2). Thus, x is socially optimal
and the desired result follows.
Suppose now that there exists some supplier n with xn > 0 and C
′
n(xn)< p (X). Then,
N∑
n=1
C ′n(xn)xn <Xp (X)≤
∫ X
0
p(q)dq, (20)
where the last inequality holds because the function p(·) is nonincreasing. Since for each n, Cn(·)
is convex and nondecreasing, with Cn(0) = 0, we have
N∑
n=1
Cn(xn)≤
N∑
n=1
C ′n(xn)xn <Xp (X)≤
∫ X
0
p(q)dq. (21)
Hence, the social welfare at the Cournot candidate,
∫ X
0
p(q)dq−∑Nn=1Cn(xn), is positive.
A.4. Proof of Proposition 6
We first observe that the vector x satisfies the necessary conditions (3)-(4) for the modified model.
Hence, the vector x is a Cournot candidate for the modified model. It is also not hard to see that
Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied by the modified model. Since αn ≥C ′n(0) for every n, Assumption
3 also holds in the modified model.
We now show that Assumption 4 holds in the modified model, i.e., that p(0)>minn{αn}. Since
the vector x is a Cournot candidate in the original model, Proposition 4 implies that X > 0, so that
there exists some n for which xn > 0. From the necessary condition (3) we have that αn ≤ p(X).
Furthermore, if αn = p(X), then ∂−p(X) = 0, and the convexity of p(·) implies that ∂+p(X) = 0.
Hence, the vector x satisfies the optimality condition (2), and thus is socially optimal in the original
model. Under our assumption that x is not socially optimal in the original model, we conclude
that αn < p(X), which implies that Assumption 4 holds in the modified model.
Let xS be an optimal solution to (1) in the original model. Since xS satisfies the optimality
conditions in (2) for the modified model, it remains a social optimum in the modified model. In
the modified model, since Assumptions 1-4 hold, the efficiency of the vector x is well defined and
given by
γ(x) =
∫ X
0
p(q)dq−∑Nn=1αnxn∫ XS
0
p(q)dq−∑Nn=1αnxSn . (22)
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Note that the denominator on the right-hand side of (22) is the optimal social welfare and the
numerator is the social welfare achieved at the Cournot candidate x, in the modified model. Propo-
sition 5 implies that both the denominator and the numerator on the right-hand side of (22) are
positive. In particular, γ(x)> 0.
Since Cn(·) is convex, we have
Cn(x
S
n)−Cn(xn)−αn(xSn −xn)≥ 0, n= 1, . . . ,N.
Adding a nonnegative quantity to the denominator cannot increase the ratio and, therefore,
1≥ γ(x) =
∫ X
0
p(q)dq−∑Nn=1Cn(xn)∫ XS
0
p(q)dq−∑Nn=1Cn(xSn) ≥
∫ X
0
p(q)dq−∑Nn=1Cn(xn)∫ XS
0
p(q)dq−∑Nn=1 (αn(xSn −xn) +Cn(xn))> 0. (23)
Since Cn(·) is convex and nondecreasing, with Cn(0) = 0, we also have
N∑
n=1
Cn(xn)−
N∑
n=1
αnxn ≤ 0. (24)
Since the right-hand side of (23) is in the interval (0,1], adding the left-hand side of Eq. (24) (a
nonpositive quantity) to both the numerator and the denominator cannot increase the ratio, as
long as the numerator remains nonnegative. The numerator remains indeed nonnegative because
it becomes the same as the numerator in the expression (22) for γ(x). We obtain
γ(x) ≥
∫ X
0
p(q)dq−∑Nn=1Cn(xn)∫ XS
0
p(q)dq−∑Nn=1 (αn(xSn −xn) +Cn(xn))
≥
∫ X
0
p(q)dq−∑Nn=1Cn(xn) +(∑Nn=1Cn(xn)−∑Nn=1αnxn)∫ XS
0
p(q)dq−∑Nn=1 (αn(xSn −xn) +Cn(xn)) +(∑Nn=1Cn(xn)−∑Nn=1αnxn)
=
∫ X
0
p(q)dq−∑Nn=1αnxn∫ XS
0
p(q)dq−∑Nn=1αnxSn
= γ(x).
The desired result follows.
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A.5. Proof of Proposition 7
By Assumption 4, p(0)>minn{C ′n(0)}. According to Proposition 4, we have X > 0. Since p(·) is
nonincreasing, the conditions in (3) imply that
C ′n(xn)≤ p (X) , if xn > 0.
Suppose that X ≥XS. Since the inverse demand function is nonincreasing and p(X) 6= p(XS), we
have p(X)< p(XS) and X >XS. For every supplier n with xn > 0, we have
C ′n(xn)≤ p (X)< p(XS)≤C ′n(xSn),
where the last inequality follows from (2). Since, Cn(·) is convex, the above inequality implies that
xn <x
S
n, if xn > 0,
from which we obtain X <XS. Since we had assumed that X ≥XS, we have a contradiction.
The preceding argument establishes that X <XS. Since p(·) is noincreasing and p(X) 6= p(XS),
we must have p(X)> p(XS).
A.6. Proof of Proposition 8
Since Assumption 4 holds, Proposition 4 implies that X > 0. Since p(·) is convex, Proposition 3
shows that p(·) is differentiable at X and the necessary conditions in (5) are satisfied.
We will now prove that p′(X) = 0. Suppose not, in which case we have p′(X)< 0. For every n
such that xn > 0, from the convexity of Cn(·) and the conditions in (5), we have
C ′n(0)≤C ′n(xn)< p(X) = p(XS).
Then, the social optimality conditions (2) imply that xSn > 0. It follows that
C ′n(xn)< p(X
S) =C ′n(x
S
n),
where the last equality follows from the optimality conditions in (2). Since Cn(·) is convex, we
conclude that xn < x
S
n. Since this is true for every n such that xn > 0, we obtain X <X
S. Since
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the function p(·) is nonincreasing, and we have p′(X)< 0 and X <XS, we obtain p(X)> p(XS),
which contradicts the assumption that p(X) = p(XS). The contradiction shows that p′(X) = 0.
Since p′(X) = 0 and the Cournot candidate x satisfies the necessary conditions in (5), it also
satisfies the optimality conditions in (2). Hence, x is socially optimal and the desired result follows.
Appendix B: Proofs of the results in Sections 4-6
B.1. Proof of Theorem 1
We note that part (d) is an immediate consequence of the expression for g(β), and we concentrate
on the remaining parts. Since the inverse demand function is convex, Proposition 3 shows that any
Cournot equilibrium satisfies the necessary conditions (5). If X > b/a, then p(X) = p′(X) = 0. In
that case, the necessary conditions (5) imply the optimality conditions (2). We conclude that x is
socially optimal.
We now assume that X ≤ b/a. Proposition 3 shows that p′(X) exists, and thus X < b/a. Since
p′(X) =−a< 0, Proposition 8 implies that p(X) 6= p(XS), for any social optimum xS. Hence, x is
not socially optimal.
As discussed in Section 3.3, to derive a lower bound, it suffices to consider the case of linear
cost functions, and obtain a lower bound on the worst case efficiency of Cournot candidates, that
is, vectors that satisfy (3)-(4). We will therefore assume that Cn(xn) = αnxn for every n. Without
loss of generality, we also assume that α1 = minn{αn}. We consider separately the two cases where
α1 = 0 or α1 > 0, respectively.
The case where α1 = 0
In this case, the socially optimal supply is XS = b/a and the optimal social welfare is∫ b/a
0
p(q)dq− 0 =
∫ b/a
0
(−ax+ b)dx= b
2
2a
.
Note also that β = aX/b.
Let x be a Cournot candidate. Suppose first that x1 = 0. In that case, the necessary conditions
0 = α1 ≥ p(X) imply that p(X) = 0. For n 6= 1, if xn > 0, the necessary conditions yield 0≤ αn =
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p(X)− xna=−xna, which implies that xn = 0 for all n. But then, X = 0, which contradicts the
fact p(X) = 0. We conclude that x1 > 0.
Since x1 > 0, the necessary conditions (5) yield 0 = α1 = b− aX − ax1, so that
x1 =−X + b
a
. (25)
In particular, X < b/a=XS, and β < 1. Furthermore,
0≤
N∑
n=2
xn =X −x1 = 2X − b
a
,
from which we conclude that β = aX/b≥ 1/2.
Note that for n= 1 we have αnxn = 0. For n 6= 1, whenever xn > 0, we have αn = p(X)− axn, so
that αnxn = (p(X)− axn)xn. The social welfare associated with x is∫ X
0
p(q)dq−
N∑
n=1
αnxn = bX − 1
2
aX2−
N∑
n=2
(p(X)− axn)xn
≥ bX − 1
2
aX2− p(X)
N∑
n=2
xn (26)
= bX − 1
2
aX2− (b− aX)(X −x1)
= bX − 1
2
aX2− (b− aX)
(
2X − b
a
)
=
3
2
aX2 +
b2
a
− 2bX.
We divide by b2/2a (the optimal social welfare) and obtain
γ(X)≥ 2a
b2
(
3
2
aX2 +
b2
a
− 2bX
)
= 3β2− 4β+ 2.
This proves the claim in part (b) of the theorem.
Tightness
We observe that the lower bound on the social welfare associated with x made use, in Eq. (26), of
the inequality
∑N
n=2 x
2
n ≥ 0. This inequality becomes an equality, asymptotically, if we let N →∞
and xn=O(1/N) for n 6= 1. This motivates the proof of tightness (part (c) of the theorem) given
below.
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We are given some β ∈ [1/2,1) and construct an N -supplier model (N ≥ 2) with a= b= 1, and
the following linear cost functions:
CN1 (x1) = 0, C
N
n (xn) =
(
p(X)− 2X − 1
N − 1
)
xn, n= 2, . . . ,N.
It can be verified that the variables
x1 =−X + b/a, xn = 2X − b/a
N − 1 , n= 2, . . . ,N,
form a Cournot equilibrium. A simple calculation (consistent with the intuition given earlier)
shows that as N increases to infinity, the sum
∑N
n=2 x
2
n goes to zero and the associated efficiency
converges to g(β).
The case where α1 > 0
We now consider the case where αn > 0 for every n. By rescaling the cost coefficients and
permuting the supplier indices, we can assume that minn{αn}= α1 = 1. By Assumption 4, we have
b > 1.
At the social optimum, we must have p(XS) = α1 = 1 and thus X
S = (b− 1)/a. The optimal
social welfare is
(b− 1)(b+ 1)
2a
− b− 1
a
=
(b− 1)2
2a
.
Note also that β = aX/(b− 1).
Similar to the proof for the case where α1 = 0, we can show that x1 > 0 and therefore 1 =
p(X)− ax1 = b− aX − ax1, so that
x1 =−X + b− 1
a
> 0,
which implies that β < 1. In particular,
X <
b− 1
a
=XS.
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Furthermore,
0≤
N∑
n=2
xn =X −x1 = 2X − b− 1
a
,
from which we conclude that β = aX/(b− 1)≥ 1/2.
A calculation similar to the one for the case where α1 = 0 yields∫ X
0
p(q)dq−
N∑
n=1
αnxn = bX − 1
2
aX2−x1−
N∑
n=2
(p(X)− axn)xn
≥ bX − 1
2
aX2+X − b− 1
a
− p(X)
N∑
n=2
xn
= bX − 1
2
aX2+X − b− 1
a
− (b− aX)(X −x1)
= bX − 1
2
aX2+X − b− 1
a
− (b− aX)
(
2X − b− 1
a
)
=
3
2
aX2 +
(b− 1)2
a
− 2(b− 1)X.
After dividing with the value of the social welfare, we obtain g(β), as desired.
B.2. Proof of Theorem 2
Let x be a Cournot candidate. According to Proposition 8, if p(X) = p(XS), then the efficiency
of the Cournot candidate must equal one, which proves part (a). To prove part (b), we assume
that p(X) 6= p(XS). By Proposition 2, the Cournot candidate x cannot be socially optimal, and,
therefore, γ(x)< 1.
We have shown in Proposition 6 that if all cost functions are replaced by linear ones, the vector
x remains a Cournot candidate, and Assumptions 1-4 still hold. Further, the efficiency of x cannot
increase after all cost functions are replaced by linear ones. Thus, to lower bound the worst case
efficiency loss, it suffices to derive a lower bound for the efficiency of Cournot candidates for the
case of linear cost functions. We therefore assume that Cn(xn) = αnxn for each n. Without loss of
generality, we further assume that α1 = minn{αn}. Note that, by Assumption 4, we have p(0)>α1.
We will prove the theorem by considering separately the cases where α1 = 0 and α1 > 0.
We will rely on Proposition 9, according to which the efficiency of a Cournot candidate x is lower
bounded by the efficiency γ0(x) of x in a model involving the piecewise linear and convex inverse
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demand function function of the form in the definition of p0(·). Note that since p(X) 6= p(XS), we
have that d> 0. For conciseness, we let y= p(X) throughout the proof.
The case α1 = 0
Let x be a Cournot candidate in the original model with linear cost functions and the inverse
demand function p(·). By Proposition 3, x satisfies the necessary conditions (5), with respect to
the original inverse demand function p(·). Suppose first that x1 = 0. The second inequality in (5)
implies that p(X) = 0. On the other hand, Assumption 4 and Proposition 4 imply that X > 0.
Thus, there exists some n such that xn > 0. The first equality in (5) yields,
0≤ αn = p(X) +xnp′(X)= xnp′(X)≤ 0,
which implies that p′(X) = 0. Then, the vector x satisfies the optimality conditions in (2), and
is thus socially optimal in the original model. This contradicts the fact that p(X) 6= p(XS) and
shows that we must have x1 > 0.
If p′(X) were equal to zero, then the necessary conditions (5) would imply the optimality con-
ditions (2), and x would be socially optimal in the original model. Hence, we must have p′(X)< 0
and c > 0. The first equality in (5) yields y > 0, x1 = y/c, and X ≥ y/c. We also have
0≤
N∑
n=2
xn =X − y
c
. (27)
From Proposition 9, the efficiency γ0(x) of x in the modified model cannot be more than its
efficiency γ(x) in the original model. Hence, to prove the second part of the theorem, it suffices to
show that γ0(x)≥ f(c), for any Cournot candidate with c/d= c.
The optimal social welfare in the modified model is
∫ ∞
0
p0(q)dq− 0 =
∫ X+y/d
0
p0(q)dq− 0 = y
2
2d
+
(2y+ cX)X
2
. (28)
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Note that for n= 1 we have αnxn = 0. For n≥ 2, whenever xn > 0, from the first equality in (5)
we have αn = y − xnc and αnxn = (y − xnc)xn. Hence, in the modified model, the social welfare
associated with x is∫ X
0
p0(q)dq−
∑N
n=1
αnxn =
(2y+ cX)X
2
−
∑N
n=2
(y−xnc)xn
≥ (2y+ cX)X
2
− y
∑N
n=2
xn
=
(2y+ cX)X
2
− y(X − y/c)
= cX2/2 + y2/c.
Therefore,
γ0(x)≥ cX
2/2 + y2/c
y2/(2d) + (2y+ cX)X/2
. (29)
Note that c, d, X, and y are all positive. Substituting c= c/d and y= cX/y in (29), we obtain
γ0(x)≥ cX
2/2 + y2/c
y2/(2d) + (2y+ cX)X/2
=
c2X2/2 + y2
y2c/(2d) + cXy+ c2X2/2
=
y2 + 2
c+ 2y+ y2
. (30)
We have shown earlier that X ≥ y/c, so that y ≥ 1. On the interval y ∈ [1,∞), the minimum
value of the right hand side of (30) is attained at
y= max
{
2− c+
√
c2− 4c+ 12
2
,1
}
∆
= φ,
and thus,
γ0(x)≥ φ
2 + 2
φ2 + 2φ+ c
= f(c).
The case α1 > 0
We now consider the case where αn > 0 for every n. By rescaling the cost coefficients and
permuting the supplier indices, we can assume that minn{αn}= α1 = 1. Suppose first that x1 = 0.
The second inequality in (5) implies that p(X)≤ 1. Proposition 4 also implies that X > 0 so that
there exists some n for which xn > 0. The first equality in (5) yields,
αn = p(X) +xnp
′(X)≤ p(X)≤ 1.
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Since αn ≥ 1, we obtain p(X) = 1 and p′(X) = 0. Then, the vector x satisfies the optimality
conditions in (2), and thus is socially optimal in the original model. But this would contradict the
fact that p(X) 6= p(XS). We conclude that x1 > 0.
If p′(X) were equal to zero, then the necessary conditions (5) would imply the optimality condi-
tions (2), and x would be socially optimal in the modified game. Therefore, we must have p′(X)< 0
and c > 0. The first equality in (5) yields y > 1, x1 = (y− 1)/c, and X ≥ (y− 1)/c. We also have
0≤
N∑
n=2
xn =X − y− 1
c
, (31)
from which we conclude that X ≥ (y− 1)/c.
From Proposition 9, the efficiency γ0(x) of the vector x in the modified model cannot be more
than its efficiency γ(x) in the original model. So, it suffices to consider the efficiency of x in the
modified model. From the optimality conditions (2), we have that p0(XS) = 1, and thus, using the
definition of d,
XS =X +
y− 1
d
.
The optimal social welfare in the modified model is
∫ XS
0
p0(q)dq−XS = y
2− 1
2d
+
(2y+ cX)X
2
−X − y− 1
d
=
(y− 1)2
2d
+X(y− 1) + cX
2
2
.
Note that for n= 1 we have αnxn = x1. For n≥ 2 and whenever xn > 0, from the first equality in
(5) we have αn = y−xnc and αnxn = (y−xnc)xn. Hence, in the modified model, the social welfare
associated with x is∫ X
0
p0(q)dq−
∑N
n=1
αnxn =Xy+ cX
2/2−x1−
∑N
n=2
(y−xnc)xn
≥Xy+ cX2/2−x1− y
∑N
n=2
xn
=X(y− 1) + cX2/2− (y− 1)
∑N
n=2
xn
=X(y− 1) + cX2/2− (y− 1)(X − (y− 1)/c)
= cX2/2 + (y− 1)2/c.
Therefore,
γ0(x)≥ cX
2/2 + (y− 1)2/c
(y− 1)2/(2d) +X(y− 1) + cX2/2 . (32)
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Note that c, d, X, and y− 1 are all positive. Substituting c= c/d and y = (cX)/(y− 1) in (32),
we obtain
γ0(x)≥ 2y
2 + 1
cy2 + 2y+ 1
. (33)
From (31) we have that y ≥ 1. On the interval y ∈ [1,∞), the minimum value of the right hand
side of (33) is attained at
y= min
{
2− c+
√
c2− 4c+ 12
2
,1
}
∆
= φ,
and thus,
γ0(x)≥ φ
2 + 2
φ2 + 2φ+ c
= f(c).
B.3. Proof of Corollary 1
Let x be a Cournot candidate. Since the inverse demand function is convex, we have that µ≥ 1. If
X >Q, then p(X) = p′(X) = 0. The necessary conditions (3)-(4) imply the optimality condition
in (2), and thus γ(x) = 1> f(µ).
Now consider the case X ≤Q. If p(X) = p(XS) for some social optimum xS, then Proposition
8 implies that γ(x) = 1> f(µ). Otherwise, for any social optimum xS, we have that c= c/d≤ µ.
Theorem 2 shows that the efficiency of every Cournot candidate cannot be less than f(c). The
desired result then follows from the fact that f(c) is decreasing in c.
B.4. Proof of Corollary 2
Let x and xS be a Cournot candidate and a social optimum, respectively. If p(X) = p(XS), for
some social optimum xS, then γ(x) = 1 and the desired result holds trivially. Now suppose that
p(X) 6= p(XS). We first derive an upper bound on the aggregate supply at a social optimum, and
then establish a lower bound on the aggregate supply at a Cournot candidate. The desired results
will follow from the fact that the function f(·) is strictly decreasing.
Step 1: There exists a social optimum with an aggregate supply no more than s.
According to Proposition 5 we have XS > 0 and there exists a supplier n such that xSn > 0. From
Tsitsiklis and Xu: Efficiency Loss in a Cournot Oligopoly with Convex Market Demand
41
the optimality conditions (2) we have p(XS) =C ′n(x
S
n), which implies that p(X
S)≥C ′n(0), due to
the convexity of the cost functions. We conclude that
p(XS) =C ′n(x
S
n)≥C ′n(0)≥min
n
C ′n(0). (34)
If p(XS) > minnC
′
n(0), then from the definition of s in (10), and the assumption that p(·) is
nonincreasing, we have that XS < s.
If p(XS) = minnC
′
n(0), by (34) we know that for any n such that x
S
n > 0, we must have C
′
n(x
S
n) =
C ′n(0) = p(X
S). Since Cn(·) is convex, we conclude that Cn(·) is actually linear on the interval
[0, xSn]. We now argue that there exists a social optimum x
S such that XS ≤ s. If XS ≤ s, then we
are done. Otherwise, we have XS > s. Let N be the set of the indices of suppliers who produce a
positive quantity at xS. Since p(·) is nonincreasing, and p(s) = minnC ′n(0) = p(XS), we know that
for any q ∈ [s,XS], p(q) =C ′n(0) for every n ∈N . Combing with the fact that for each supplier n
in the set N , Cn(·) is linear on the interval [0, xSn], we have∫ XS
s
p(q)dq= (XS − s)C ′n(x), ∀n∈N , ∀x∈ [0, xSn),
from which we conclude that the vector, (s/XS) ·xS, yields the same social welfare as xS, and thus
is socially optimal. Note that the aggregate supply at (s/XS) ·xS is s.
If p(X) = p(XS), then γ(x) = 1 and the desired result holds trivially. Otherwise, since p(·) is
nonincreasing and convex, we have
|∂−p(s)| ≤
∣∣(p(XS)− p(X))/(XS −X)∣∣= d. (35)
Step 2: The aggregate supply at a Cournot candidate x is at least t.
Since p(·) is convex, x satisfies the necessary conditions in (5). Therefore,
C ′n(xn)≥ p(X) +xnp′(X), ∀n. (36)
Since X ≥ xn, we have
C ′n(xn)≤C ′n(X), Xp′(X)≤ xnp′(X), (37)
Tsitsiklis and Xu: Efficiency Loss in a Cournot Oligopoly with Convex Market Demand
42
where the first inequality follows from the convexity of the cost functions, and the second one is
true because p′(X)≤ 0. Combing (36) and (37), we have
C ′n(X)≥ p(X) +Xp′(X), ∀n,
which implies that X ≥ t. Since p(·) is nonincreasing and convex, we have
c= |p′(X)| ≤ |∂+p(t)| . (38)
Since ∂−p(s)< 0, Eqs. (35) and (38) yield
c= c/d≤ ∂+p(t)/∂−p(s).
The desired result follows from Theorem 2, and the fact that f(·) is strictly decreasing.
Appendix C: Proofs of the results in Section 7
C.1. Proof of Theorem 3
According to the discussion in Section 7, we only need to lower bound the efficiency of a Cournot
equilibrium x in a model with N = 1. Since N = 1, we can identify the vectors x and xS with the
scalars X and XS. If p(X) = p(XS), then according to Proposition 8, the efficiency of the Cournot
equilibrium, X, must equal one, which establishes part (a).
We now turn to the proof of part (b), and we assume that p(X) 6= p(XS). According to Propo-
sition 2, we know that x cannot be socially optimal. We will consider separately the cases where
α1 = 0 and α1 > 0.
We will again rely on Proposition 9, according to which the efficiency of a Cournot candidate x
is lower bounded by the efficiency γ0(x) of x in a model involving the piecewise linear and convex
inverse demand function p0(·). Note that since p(X) 6= p(XS), we have that d> 0. As shown in the
proof of Theorem 2, we have p′(X)< 0, i.e., c > 0. For conciseness, we let y= p(X) throughout the
proof.
The case α1 = 0
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Applying conditions (5) to the supplier we have X = y/c. From Proposition 9, it suffices to show
that γ0(x)≥ 3/(3 + c). The optimal social welfare in the modified model is∫ ∞
0
p0(q)dq− 0 =
∫ X+y/d
0
p0(q)dq− 0 = y
2
2d
+
(2y+ cX)X
2
. (39)
In the modified model, the social welfare associated with x is∫ XP
0
p0(q)dq− 0 = (2y+ cX)X
2
.
Therefore,
γ0(x) =
(2y+ cX)X/2
y2/(2d) + (2y+ cX)X/2
=
3
3 + c
,
where the last equality is true because xc= y.
Tightness
Consider the model introduced in the proof of part (c) of Theorem 1. The inverse demand
function is p(q) = max{1− q,0}. The supplier’s cost function is identically zero, i.e., C1(x1) = 0.
The profit maximizing output is x1 = 1/2. We observe that γ(x) = 3/4.
The case α1 > 0
We now consider the case where α1 > 0. By rescaling the cost coefficients and permuting the
supplier indices, we can assume that α1 = 1. Applying conditions (5) to the supplier, we obtain
X = (y− 1)/c.
According to Proposition 9, it suffices to show that the efficiency of x in the modified model,
γ0(x), is at least 3/(3 + c). From the optimality conditions (2) we have that p0(XS) = 1, and
therefore,
XS =X + (y− 1)/d.
The optimal social welfare achieved in the modified model is∫ XS
0
p0(q)dq−XS = y
2− 1
2d
+
(2y+ cX)X
2
−X − y− 1
d
=
(y− 1)2
2d
+XP (y− 1) + c(X)
2
2
.
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In the modified model, the social welfare associated with x is
∫ X
0
p0(q)dq−X =X(y− 1) + cX
2
2
.
Since cX = y− 1, we have
γ0(x) =
3
3 + c
.
C.2. Proof of Corollary 3
Note that the efficiency of a monopoly output equals the efficiency of a Cournot equilibrium in
a modified model with N = 1. Therefore, the desired result follows from the proof of Corollary
2, except that the general lower bound f(·) is replaced by the tighter one, 3/(3 + c), provided by
Theorem 3.
